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Since the early 1970s, when the nation watched in horror as racial antagonism inBoston erupted into protests and riots over the issue of court-ordered busing in
education, the city has endured lingering international, national, and local perceptions
about its poor race relations. Whether entirely true or not, the perspective has often
worked to divide a city already fractured along racial lines. Racial hostilities re-
emerged in the late 1990s, this time over the affirmative action admission policy of
the Boston Latin School, one of the city’s three examination-based magnet schools.
On November 19, 1998, the First Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the affirma-
tive action admission policy of Boston Latin, holding that it violated the Equal Pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.1  The decision,
which pinched a nerve that has consistently troubled the city, set off the latest round
of salvos from those on either side of the affirmative action debate, and once again,
Boston’s various communities found themselves in a contentious battle over the fate
of the city’s children. It has been more two years since the Court of Appeals ruling,
and quite predictably, some of this furor has subsided. Time has, however, done little
more than stop the bleeding; the rift remains. The judicial resolution of the issue has
not solved the epistemological divide in the Boston community over what values
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The author seeks to shift the traditional focus of the affirmative action debate
from race to class. With the Boston Latin School as an example, he argues that,
under certain circumstances, a shift in an admission policy based on preferences
from race to class will maintain academic standards while increasing minority
representation; it will also expand opportunity for economically underprivileged
youths who have succeeded academically despite the obstacles they face. A fo-
cus on class rather than race offers both sides of the affirmative action debate a
philosophy that can be reconciled with their views on race-based affirmative
action. In certain situations, class-based affirmative action in the context of
school admission offers a practical, successful alternative to the debate that has
been raging for years.
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In Boston, as well as across the nation, the partisan ideology of the affirmative
action front is laden with emotion and history. So much so, in fact, that there has
been little room for the emergence of new ideas on the issue. Instead, since June
1965, when President Lyndon Johnson first outlined the concept of affirmative ac-
tion in a speech at Howard University, those on both sides of the issue have contin-
ued to bang their heads against a wall of opposition, merely speaking at, and too
often past, those they seek to convince. Such entrenchment is predictable given the
vast philosophical gulf between the two sides. The differences over affirmative ac-
tion are difficult to reconcile. Although a strictly formalistic approach to admission
preserves many of the principles of meritocracy and the free market that America
holds so dear, it often limits the range of people for whom it truly opens up market
or educational opportunities. Conversely, the race-conscious, results-based approach
of affirmative action tends to treat people as members of a group rather than as
individuals, and it can stigmatize the very group or individual it intends to help.
These competing visions have led to an intractable ideological conflict. It is on this
chiaroscuro that the city of Boston must work to recreate an admission policy for
Boston Latin that is constitutional, implementable, and palatable to the array of
interest groups invested in the city’s school system.
In striking down Boston Latin’s affirmative action admission policy, the First
Circuit left open a limited possibility for the school to continue an admission policy
that relies on race as a factor.2  The political will to administer such a program has
evaporated, however, leaving the city with an admission policy based on student
grade point average and standardized test scores that still frustrates many. How
might Boston escape this pitched battle over admissions and devise a plan acceptable
to both sides of the debate? One possibility is a race-neutral scheme of admissions
with the stated goal of aiding disadvantaged students through affirmative action
programs based on class, not race. Such a class-based scheme presents a condign
alternative to the embattled creed of both camps in the traditional affirmative action
debate. An admission policy based on class rather than race would, in its simplest
form, take into account parental income in determining whether to grant a student
an admission preference. At its most complex, such action would rely on a sophisti-
cated formula to determine which students receive admission preferences; parental
income, wealth, and education, as well as family structure and neighborhood influ-
ences, would affect the relative advantage to a student in the admissions process.
Though not a panacea for all problems, class-based affirmative action could
bridge the gap between the competing views on race-based affirmative action.
Working within the parameters of the Constitution, it corrects some of the problems
associated with racism without upsetting the free market ideals of individuality and
meritocracy that drive many opponents of traditional affirmative action. Although
the approach is assailable, and has come under attack from both sides of the debate,
in certain situations its application works to undermine many of the criticisms that
attach to it. A small, heterogeneous city like Boston has the size limitations and
diversity to enable class-based affirmative action to be a successful, constitutional
answer to the admissions question over which the city has been fighting — an an-
swer that could be acceptable, politically and philosophically, to Boston’s vast array
of interest groups and would benefit those whom Boston Latin was designed to
serve, the city’s brightest children.
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Background
Founded in 1635, the Boston Latin School is the oldest public school in America,
and is the most prestigious of Boston’s three examination-based magnet schools.3  In
assessing any admission policy to Boston Latin, it is important to note just how
impressive the school is. Among its other notable alumni, Boston Latin claims five
signers of the Declaration of Independence as former students, including Benjamin
Franklin, John Hancock, and Samuel Adams. Both academically rigorous and intel-
lectually challenging, it stands as a strict meritocratic test for those students who are
admitted, rewarding achievement, and embracing the idea that education is partly a
race in which some will fare better than others.4  “Excellence in education is not
elitist,” former headmaster Michael Contompasis told The New York Times.5 “It is
what made America strong.”6
Over the last three hundred sixty-six years, the school has maintained its superb
reputation, surviving controversies along the way over coeducation and desegrega-
tion in the 1970s and later, “fiscal uncertainty, layoffs, accusations of elitism, as-
saults on traditional education, and political maneuvering.”7 In 2000, for the second
straight year, students at Boston Latin boasted the highest Massachusetts Comprehen-
sive Assessment System test scores in the state.8 Admitted students can anticipate up
to three hours of homework nightly. On graduation more than 98 percent of Boston
Latin graduates go on to four-year colleges; of those students, roughly 90 percent
receive some sort of scholarship.9 Given this history and continuing legacy of
achievement, competition to be admitted into the school is fierce. More than three
thousand applicants apply for the roughly four hundred forty places open in the
seventh grade each year. Overall, fewer than 10 percent of the city’s seventh through
twelve graders attend Boston Latin, making it a haven for the most talented children
in the city.
Despite enjoying a special status among Boston schools, Boston Latin is still part
of the Boston public school system. Any change in the school system required by
either the courts or the School Committee affects Boston Latin just as it does the
other schools. In 1974, a federal district court ruled that the city of Boston had vio-
lated the constitutional rights of African-American children by promoting and main-
taining a racially segregated public school system.10 At the time, although the court
found no specific evidence that Boston Latin’s examination-based admission policy
discriminated against anyone, or that those in charge of Boston Latin were purposely
discriminating and intending to promote school segregation, the demographics of the
school made it abundantly clear that the city’s examination schools helped to main-
tain and promote a dual system that other Boston policies had invidiously pro-
moted.11 The court ordered Boston Latin and the other examination-based schools to
ensure that African-American and Latino children comprise a minimum of 35 per-
cent of each entering class.12
In 1987, the court reviewed the public school system again. Based upon the dis-
tribution of students in the system, and a finding of a good faith effort towards
change demonstrated by the school administrators, the court relinquished control of
the system’s student assignments.13 Nevertheless, though it was no longer under a
legal duty to do so, the Boston School Committee chose to continue the admission
policy.14 In 1995, however, Catherine McLaughlin, a disappointed applicant, chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the 35 percent set-aside for minority admission.15  A
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district court granted injunctive relief, and the School Committee discontinued the
plan.16 Fearing that this change in admission policy would drain the examination
schools of African-American and Hispanic students, school officials adopted a more
flexible set aside policy.17
The flexible policy worked as follows: to gain admission to any one of the exam
schools, a student had to take a standardized test, the results of which were com-
bined with each applicant’s grade point average (hereinafter GPA).18 This produced
a composite score that school administrators used to rank all students.19 School offi-
cials then assigned individuals to the applicant pools for the examination schools in
which the students had expressed an interest.20 To be eligible for admission to any
one of the three schools, an applicant had to be in the “qualified” applicant pool
(hereinafter QAP), which was comprised of the top 50 percent of the overall appli-
cant pool of the selective school of their choice.21 Half the available seats at an ex-
amination school were allocated in strict accordance with the composite score rank
order.22 To select the other half, school officials determined the relative proportions
of five different racial ethnic categories (white, African-American, Hispanic, Asian,
Native American) of the students in the QAP who had not been selected on the basis
of their composite score.23 School administrators then filled the remaining seats
using composite scores, but the total number of students selected from each racial/
ethnic category had to be proportionate to the percentage of each racial/ethnic cat-
egory in the remaining QAP.24 Because the makeup of those admitted had to mirror
that of the remaining QAP, it was possible for a member of a certain racial/ethnic
group to be passed over in favor of a lower ranking applicant of a different racial/
ethnic group if the seats allotted to the former’s ethnic/racial group had been filled.25
This is exactly what happened to Sarah Wessman in 1997.26 Boston Latin had 90
seats available for the entering ninth-grade class.27 Based on her composite score,
Wessman ranked 91st in the QAP.28 To fill the first 45 seats, the school extended
invitations to 47 candidates (two declined to attend).29 Had composite scores alone
been used to evaluate the rest of the applicants, Wessman would have been admit-
ted.30 However, because the racial/ethnic makeup of the remaining QAP was 27.83
percent African-American, 40.41 percent white, 19.21 percent Asian, 11.64 percent
Hispanic, and 0.31 percent Native American,31 the remaining 45 spots were allocated
to 13 African-American students, 18 white students, 9 Asian students, and 5 His-
panic students.32 As a result, African-American and Hispanic children, with compos-
ite score rankings between 95th and 150th, were admitted ahead of Sarah Wessman
and 10 other white students with higher composite scores.33
The First Circuit’s decision in Wessman v. Gittens invalidating Boston Latin’s
flexible set-aside policy followed a trend among American courts giving little sup-
port for race-based affirmative action.34 The court insisted, however, that it was not
declaring affirmative action dead.35 Thus, the case is important for several reasons.
First, unlike the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas, the First Circuit affirmed the
Supreme Court’s tenuous decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
that diversity is a compelling state interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.36 S c-
ond, the court indicated that educational institutions must show a dearth of minority
representation before diversity will suffice as a compelling state interest.37 Third, it
confirmed that educational institutions will have a hard time establishing that their
admission programs are created to remedy past discrimination.38 Finally, it suggested
that schools should consider creating admission policies that provide opportunity for
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those from particular underrepresented schools, as opposed to underrepresented
racial groups.39
Standard of Review
Any admission policy that considers race as a factor must survive strict judicial scru-
tiny to avoid invalidation under the Fourteenth Amendment.40 Although the strict
scrutiny standard of review arose as a way to protect certain minority groups, it has
later been applied to any public law regarding race, whether it burdens or benefits a
minority group.41 In 1989, in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, the Supreme Court
ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state or local government to demon-
strate a compelling state interest in order to award governmental contracts based on
race.42 More recently, in Ardarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court used the
same standard in holding that “all racial classifications, imposed by whatever fed-
eral, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny. Such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tai-
lored measures further compelling governmental interests.”43
Many lower courts have also applied strict scrutiny in striking down race-con-
scious policies in the field of education.44 Of these cases, Hopwood v. Texas has
garnered the most attention. There the court struck down an admission policy at the
University of Texas Law School that used different standards for admitting whites
and certain minorities.45 In applying strict scrutiny to the case, the court found that
achieving diversity cannot serve as a compelling state interest and that the school
failed to prove that the policy remedied the present effects of past discrimination.46
Similarly, in Podberesky v. Kirwan, the Fourth Circuit struck down a University of
Maryland scholarship program limited to black students, holding that the university
presented insufficient proof that the policy remedied the present effects of past dis-
crimination.47 Because of the narrowness of the remedial exception, the question
naturally arises whether at least in the educational setting, diversity can supply the
necessary compelling state interest.
Diversity as a Compelling State Interest
In Wessman, the court noted a trend away from treating diversity as a compelling
state interest but stated that “any such consensus is more apparent than real.”48 Th
court stressed that Hopwood is the only case to have rejected diversity outright, and
it emphasized that it did so “only in the face of a vigorous dissent from a substantial
minority of the active judges of the Fifth Circuit.”49 Although the panel in Hopwood
pronounced Justice Powell’s controlling opinion in Bakke dead, the Wessman court
balked at this apparent act of lower court reversal of a Supreme Court precedent: “It
may be that the Hopwood panel is correct and that, were the [Supreme] Court to
address the question today, it would hold that diversity is not a sufficiently compel-
ling interest to justify a race-based classification. It has not done so yet, however,
and we are not prepared to make such a declaration in the absence of a clear signal
that we should.”50
Despite the First Circuit’s unwillingness to follow the Fifth Circuit’s stringent
precedent, it would seem that Boston Latin falls outside any need for diversity that
the First Circuit might find compelling. The School Committee acknowledged at
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oral argument that Boston Latin had historically been diverse with respect to every-
thing but race and ethnicity (gender, neighborhood, and socioeconomic representa-
tion).51 The court noted that over the previous ten years, if the school had used the
strict merit approach, black and Hispanic students would have made up roughly 15
to 20 percent of each entering class, and minorities as a whole would have consti-
tuted an even greater percentage.52 The court noted, “Even on the assumption that
the need for racial and ethnic diversity alone might sometimes constitute a compel-
ling interest sufficient to warrant some type of corrective governmental action, it is
perfectly clear that the need would have to be acute — much more acute than the
relatively modest deviations that attend the instant case. . . . The School
Committee’s flexible racial/ethnic guidelines appear to be less a means of attaining
diversity in any constitutionally relevant sense and more a means for racial balanc-
ing.”53 Thus, though the court did not dismiss Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke that
diversity can serve as a compelling state interest, it left proponents of race-based
affirmative action with little room to justify their policy on the grounds of diversity
as a compelling state interest, given the makeup of Boston Latin.54 Therefore, any
attempt to revive a race-based admission policy would have to do so under the guise
of eliminating the vestiges of past discrimination.55
Eliminating the Vestiges of Past Discrimination
A series of Supreme Court decisions has made it very difficult for any governmental
race-based policy to pass constitutional muster unless it is narrowly tailored to rem-
edy specific, identifiable instances of prior discrimination.56 The Court has struck
down racial preferences in government contracting, and in drawing congressional
and legislative districts,57 and the Court has recognized that remedying the present
effects of past discrimination can serve as a compelling state interest only if there is
a “strong basis in evidence” to prove those effects.58 The Wessman court, following
suit, required the school board not only to detail what disparities existed between
minorities and whites, but to produce evidence that these disparities were not the
result of other factors, such as societal discrimination, that are wholly separate from
those produced by the Boston school system.59
The court rejected the School Committee’s main allegation that low teacher ex-
pectations for black and Hispanic students persist throughout the school system and
represent an attitudinal remnant of past discrimination.60 The School Committee’s
theory leaned heavily on the testimony of a sociologist whose primary research had
been conducted in the Kansas City school system.61 The court dismissed this testi-
mony because the sociologist’s work had no relation to Boston, amounting to mere
speculation of correlation as opposed to evidence of causation.62 Furthermore, the
court refused to accept the testimony because the expert conceded that the data used
“was not of the quality necessary to satisfy methodological rigors required by his
discipline.”63 Similarly, the court rejected other testimony on the issue because it was
anecdotal and therefore possessed no methodological or empirical support for its
conclusions.64 However, the court did not go so far as to “propose that the achieve-
ment gap bears no relation to some form of prior discrimination.”65
Despite a few reservations, the First Circuit was willing to accept the elimination
of vestiges of past discrimination as a compelling state interest if it was presented
with sufficient evidence.66 First, the court maintained that in order for any admission
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policy to survive the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, the school committee
needed to be able to explain how the policy would alleviate a major cause of the
remnant of past discrimination.67 When asked about this at trial, the deputy school
superintendent was unable to respond with any clarity, claiming that it was a “com-
plicated question to answer.”68 Second, the court noted that the admission policy was
too broad, as it would affect minorities applying to Boston Latin from private
schools who had never been affected by the present remnants of past discrimination
in the Boston school system.69 Last, the court noted that the policy was overbroad
because it could have the unintended effect of denying admission to a minority stu-
dent in favor of a white who had never been negatively affected by past discrimina-
tion.70 In fact, the court noted, this very situation occurred at the O’Bryant School,
one of Boston’s other examination schools that used the same admission policy.71
There, two Hispanic students were rejected from the 1997 ninth-grade entering class
in favor of a white student simply because the number of Hispanic students in the
QAP was small, and thus fewer seats could be allotted to Hispanic students.72
The court’s decision, written in the face of a vigorous dissent which argued that
the evidence presented was sufficient to prove the vestiges of past discrimination in
the Boston school system, opens the door, if only slightly, for proponents of affir-
mative action who continue to advocate for its implementation in the Boston school
system. Empirical data about the effect of low teacher expectations on minority
students, coupled with a more narrowly tailored admission policy might prove con-
stitutional under the First Circuit reasoning. But any new plan would have to
supply a solid reason why such a policy would work to undermine low teacher ex-
pectations, and it would have to be limited to only those children who have passed
through the Boston public school system and been adversely affected by the present
remnants of prior discrimination.
What Next?
Obviously, a plan that fits these remedial requirements would be difficult to create.
Nor is it clear that the School Committee would even wish to succeed. It is inevi-
table that one day the Supreme Court will take up the issue of affirmative action in
educational admission policies again, and there is a significant probability that it will
reject them save under narrow remedial circumstances that might not apply to Bos-
ton Latin. In the meantime, in order to gauge the future, we are left to search public
opinion and interpret judicial reasoning. The Supreme Court has asserted that race-
based affirmative action will be subject to strict scrutiny;73 the Federal Appeals
courts for Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi have struck down the use of race in
admission to public universities;74 voters in California have amended their state con-
stitution to forbid discrimination in favor of or against persons due to race or gen-
der;75 and public opinion polls across the country show that support for affirmative
action is waning.76 Regardless of whether or not a new race-based admission policy
at Boston Latin could withstand the First Circuit’s scrutiny, the impetus for race-
based affirmative action is fading.
Not surprisingly, Boston school superintendent Thomas Payzant abandoned the
idea of implementing a new race-based admission policy to Boston Latin.77 Instead,
on October 20, 1999, Payzant recommended a new policy, which was met with
some initial resistance within the School Committee and at public hearings.78 Fir t,
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Payzant proposed that the school system continue to use the Independent Secondary
School Entrance Exam and unweighted grade point averages as barometers of stu-
dent aptitude, reasoning that, “assigning additional weights to different programs
and schools does not substantively change enrollment patterns and contributes to a
false sense of precision.”79 Second, Payzant recommended that fifth and seventh
grade GPAs be used as well as those from sixth and eighth grades, claiming that “the
addition of 5th and 7th grade final marks to compute the GPA would provide the
perspective of additional teachers in assessing students’ work and mitigate the ad-
verse impact on a student who experienced poor grades in one 6th or 8th grade
marking period.”80 Third, Payzant recommended that equal weight be given to a
student’s grade point average and test scores in calculating a student’s composite
score, reasoning that “equal weight for grades and test scores gives fair consideration
both to students who have equal strengths balanced across both types of indicators,
as well as students who have greater strength in one of these areas.”81
Class-Based Affirmative Action as an Alternative
With regard to Boston Latin, race-based affirmative action has proved to be both
unconstitutional and ineffective at remedying vestiges of past discrimination, the
core reason for its theoretical inception. Ironically, although the Wessman decision
produced a wealth of newspaper editorials, school meetings, and soul searching by
those on all sides of the issue, it did not create any real change in the demographics
of Boston Latin. It is surprising to note that after the passion aroused by the
Wessman case, Boston Latin remains, with respect to diversity, just where it was in
recent years past. Indeed, one might wonder if the whole debate was much ado
about nothing. The old affirmative action scheme at Boston Latin did little more to
aid non-Asian minorities and the underprivileged than does the strict merit ap-
proach. The racial makeup of the 1999 Boston Latin seventh-grade class, the first to
be admitted under the post-Wessman race neutral guidelines, looked much the same
as the previous year’s class.82 Of the 440 seventh graders accepted by Boston Latin,
56 percent were white, an increase of 2 percent over the 1998–1999 school year.83
Roughly 19 percent of those accepted were African-American and Hispanic children,
and the number of Asian students remained at 25 percent.84
Under both the race-based affirmative action admission plan and the strictly merit
plan, the student body at Boston Latin stands in stark contrast to the rest of the stu-
dent population in the Boston public school system. While roughly 75 percent of the
city’s public school children are African-American and Latino, less than one-third of
that percentage is accounted for at Boston Latin.85 Just as surprising is that in 1996,
70 percent of new Boston Latin students came from either private schools or five of
the city’s seventy-five elementary schools.86 Moreover, although 62 percent of Bos-
ton public middle and high school students systemwide are poor or working class —
eligible for free or reduced price lunches — it was predicted that under the strictly
merit-based admission policy only 29 percent of the Boston Latin student body
would qualify for such lunches.87 That number is exactly the same as that under the
affirmative action scheme struck down by Wessman.88
For those who are disappointed with the present system, there is a strong incen-
tive to look elsewhere for solutions. Class-based affirmative action will indirectly
compensate for past discrimination while emphasizing a goal promoted by both
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supporters and detractors of race-based affirmative action: equal opportunity.89 The
essence of class-based affirmative action is the desire to give aid to those children
who have performed well in overcoming obstacles that are linked to poor academic
performance.
As Richard Kahlenberg, a law professor who has written extensively in support of
class-based affirmative action, claims, “Class preferences help those who need it.”90
The poor face obstacles to achievement that go unaddressed by antidiscrimination
laws; these obstacles are either mitigated or exacerbated by the issue of race, but
they remain present in some form for all who do not have money.91 Although
American ideology trumpets the notion of meritocracy and equal opportunity, the
actual opportunity to break free from the class into which one is born is rare.92 Soci-
ologist Christopher Jenks has noted:
If we define “equal opportunity” as a situation in which sons born into different families
have the same chances of success, our data show that America comes nowhere near
achieving it. . . . The sons of the most advantaged fifth could expect to earn 150 percent
to 186 percent of the national average, while the sons of the least advantaged fifth could
expect to earn 56 percent to 67 percent of the national average.93
Indeed, it is frightening that one could walk into a hospital crèche, knowing noth-
ing more than the class into which each baby happened to be born, and predict what
economic success each child will have over the course of his lifetime. Class-based
affirmative action works to undermine this reality by stressing equality, to the extent
that it attempts to account for many of the externalities that stunt learning in certain
environments. However, individual liberty is not lost; class-based affirmative action
can be distinguished from measures designed to bring about general equality of
socioeconomic status. The policy does not guarantee results, but instead allows natu-
ral talent to dictate success, to the extent that one is willing to work hard to obtain
it. Primary and secondary schools, rather than colleges, universities, and entry-level
jobs, provide the only substantive avenue for an individual born into poverty to
advance. Boston Latin, the premier public school in Boston, bears the weight of this
reality, and for this reason ought to open its doors to talented children from all
walks of life across the city.
Although many support the ideal of equal opportunity, it is both expensive and
intrusive to equalize starting places.94 Class preferences seek to adjust for the latent
potential of those who have faced obstacles and done fairly well nonetheless.95 Al-
though a racial preference might unfairly benefit the daughter of an African-Ameri-
can doctor who has enjoyed all the benefits that accrue to the well-to-do over the
son of a white welfare recipient, a class preference would focus on the party lacking
opportunity, in this case the white boy.96 Much of the debate over race-based affir-
mative action focuses not on being a minority per se, but on what it entails to be a
minority. Although minority status does not automatically confer socioeconomic
disadvantage on an individual, there is a strong correlation between the two. When
viewed in this light, minority status is not synonymous with one’s attributes and how
they relate to success, but rather with the external obstacles one must face on the
road to success. Both sides of the equality debate might agree that counting obstacles
overcome, along with academic qualifications, better approximates true meritocracy
than adding points for racial background or looking exclusively at test scores.97
Many Americans acknowledge that the poor lack opportunities enjoyed by the
rich and that, because of past discrimination, African-Americans are disproportion-
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ately poor.98 Thus, many who would benefit from race-based affirmative action will
also benefit from class-based affirmative action. However, individuals who belong
to a historically oppressed group but who have prospered will not. A limiting theory
that addresses only economic disadvantage, not continued direct societal discrimina-
tion, avoids speculation about one’s personality or background simply on the basis
of race, offering the public a more palatable option for providing equal opportunity
to all; a New York Times poll of December 1998 found that while Americans reject
racial preferences 52 percent to 35 percent, they support replacing such policies with
preferences for the poor by 53 percent to 37 percent.99
What Factors Can Implement
Class-Based Affirmative Action?
Any definition of class should begin with the family income of an applicant, as
income is the most readily attainable measure of the gap between the rich, the
middle class, and the poor.100 Income alone, however, is sometimes a misleading
indicator of class restrictions. In The Remedy: Class, Race, and Affirmative Action,
Richard Kahlenberg details a more copious definition that involves five other factors
distinct from family income: parental education, wealth, and occupation, as well as
family structure and neighborhood influences on a child.101
These additional indicators expose anomalous situations in which parental income
belies actual class impediments. There is a strong correlation between parental edu-
cation and a child’s academic achievement and life chances.102 As Kahlenberg notes,
“A private school teacher with a master’s degree may make less than a unionized
sanitation worker, but provide her child with greater educational advantages.”103
Although wealth normally correlates with income, ascertaining a family’s net wealth
helps to round out the picture, especially where one parent has taken time off from
work but still possesses many assets.104 Furthermore, African-Americans generally
have less net wealth than whites of the same income group, “partly due to residential
discrimination and less inherited ‘family’ money, so including net worth in the cal-
culus helps reflect that legacy as well.”105
Taking account of parental occupation adds another check in determining ob-
stacles overcome; a father’s occupational status has traditionally been a better predic-
tor of his son’s eventual occupation than the father’s wealth.106 Also, family structure
is often a good predictor of a child’s success.107 Many children reared in one-parent
households have continued on to success, but as Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur
have noted, “Adolescents who have lived apart from one of their parents during
some period of childhood are twice as likely to drop out of high school, twice as
likely to have a child before the age of twenty, and one and a half times as likely to
be ‘idle’ — out of school and out of work — in their late teens and early twen-
ties.”108 Finally, neighborhood influences, such as the percentage of households liv-
ing in poverty, median family income, male unemployment rate, and percentage of
female-headed households, are objective measures of externalities that could have a
negative influence on a child’s life chances.109
The creation of six class-based categories by which to judge an applicant allows
for an objective analysis of obstacles overcome by a candidate. The importance of
an objective standard by which to measure class is highlighted when juxtaposed to a
subjective standard such as the California state university admission plan that calls
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for extra consideration for those who have lived in “an abusive or otherwise dys-
functional home.”110 Unless there has been state action verifying that a child has
endured an abusive or otherwise dysfunctional home, using such a subjective factor
makes a preference system almost unimplementable. Additionally, critics question
whether allowing the applicant to define his home situation as advantaged or disad-
vantaged will induce applicants to “play the victim.”111 Relying on objective, quanti-
fiable factors allows administrators to compare applications effectively, and it re-
lieves an aspirant of the ignominious task of regurgitating all that has gone wrong in
his life.
Although such comprehensive class indicators help to define disadvantage, not all
impediments to equal opportunity concern class. Physical disability, language diffi-
culties, and direct societal discrimination are additional disadvantages that hinder
success.112 Ideally, schools would consider these factors when reviewing admission
applications, although at some point, of course, the trade-off between fairness and
efficiency tips in favor of the latter.113 Class remains the most easily implementable,
effective gauge of disadvantage.
Is Class-Based Affirmative Action Constitutional?
Of course, it would be a waste of time, energy, and political capital to craft an ad-
mission plan to displace the current one if it too violated the Constitution. Class-
based affirmative action does not pose a constitutional problem. For the purposes of
Equal Protection analysis, the Supreme Court does not treat individuals of lower
socioeconomic status as a suspect class.114 Thus, unlike a race-based plan, any effort
to create class-based affirmative action will not be subject to strict scrutiny by the
Court.115 In the field of education, the Court has refused to strike down the class-
based unfairness of inequitable funding. For example, in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodrigez, the Court refused to apply strict scrutiny to a Texas
school financing system that relied on local property taxation, therefore dispropor-
tionately benefiting children from communities with a high property tax base.116 In
fact, even a showing that a school is aware that its choice of factors for class-based
affirmative action will have a disproportionate effect on a racial class would not
violate the Equal Protection clause.117
Perhaps the first inkling that the Supreme Court would support a class-based
program came in 1974, when Justice William Douglass, dissenting in Defunis v.
Odegaard, argued that the Equal Protection clause could allow consideration of
“barriers that [the applicant] had to overcome.”118 Since then, the composition of the
Court has changed drastically, but it has become more evident that it would be will-
ing to accept class-based measures. Both Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence
Thomas, two of the most vociferous opponents of race-based affirmative action,
endorsed class-based preferences before ascending to the Court.119 In City of Rich-
mond v. Croson, the Court struck down a minority business utilization set-aside
plan.120 Justice Scalia noted in his concurring opinion that states could “adopt a pref-
erence for small business, or even for new businesses — which would make it easier
for those previously excluded by discrimination to enter the field. Such programs
may well have a racially disproportionate impact, but they are not based on race.”121
Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, another conservative mem-
ber of the Court, was even more sympathetic to race-neutral measures set up to ad-
dress the barriers faced by many small or new business owners.122
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Because a class-based policy does not require strict scrutiny under Equal Protec-
tion jurisprudence, all that is necessary for a class-based scheme to pass constitu-
tional muster is that it be rationally related to a legitimate state interest, which in the
case of Boston Latin could be said to be the provision of an equal opportunity for all
talented children to attend the city’s premier public high school.
The Implementation of Class-Based
Affirmative Action at Boston Latin
In 1996, after the constitutionality of Boston Latin’s set-aside program was first
questioned, Boston school superintendent Thomas Payzant commissioned Bain &
Co. (hereinafter Bain), a consulting firm, to review possible admission schemes that
might affect the school’s racial and ethnic makeup.123 The policy chosen by the
School Committee was the one eventually struck down in the Wessman case. In the
process of creating options, however, Bain reviewed other policies that took eco-
nomic factors into account. Bain did not use Richard Kahlenberg’s more complex
economic and social indicia to create its alternative policies. Instead, it simply used
the qualification for free or reduced price lunch as an indicator of disadvantage.124
Nonetheless, the various policies succeed in achieving a racial mix similar to that of
both the current race-neutral admission policy and the unconstitutional policy of
Wessman. At the same time, they increase the number of disadvantaged children at
Boston Latin and reduce the number of children transferring in from private schools,
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Methodology for Table 1
Numerous plans, most of which appear in the table, were examined by Bain. Bain’s
policies weighted certain criteria more or less in determining who would be admit-
ted. Class, as defined by qualification for free or reduced-price lunches was one
weighted factor, but Bain also explored policies that offered bonuses to the children
who were applying to Boston Latin from a Boston public school or policies that
divided the city into ten educational “clusters” and required some measure of pro-
portional geographical representation at Boston Latin. Bain predicted how each
plan would affect Boston Latin:
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Admission policy F, for example, would allocate 50 percent of Boston Latin’s
seats to those with top composite scores (grade point average and standardized test
scores), and 50 percent to ten city clusters based on student population. Seats within
each cluster would be awarded to the applicants with the highest composite scores,
after a 5 percent bonus is added to economically qualified students’ scores. This plan
ensures a cross section of students from each city neighborhood and benefits those
who have excelled in their particular circumstances. Under such a policy, the pre-
dicted mix of black and Hispanic students at Boston Latin is 23 percent, a higher
percentage than the current number and higher too than that under the unconstitu-
tional affirmative action policy. The percentage of seats filled by the highest-ranking
applicants is predicted to be 83 percent, lower than both the current policy and a
race-based affirmative action policy but roughly tantamount to all other policies
contemplated. At the same time, the percentage of students receiving free or reduced
Plan A: Straight from the top: all seats awarded based on predictive
formulas only.
Plan B: 75% Allocation Option: 25% seats awarded on predictive for-
mulas only.  75% allocated to the ten city neighborhood clusters based on
student population.  Within each cluster, seats are awarded based on pre-
dictive formula only.
Plan C: 50% Allocation: Same premise as Plan B, but the breakdown
between methods is 50/50.
Plan D: 7.5% Economic Bonus: 7.5% bonus added to the predictive
formulas of students who are economically qualified (for the purposes of
all of the plans concerning economics, this term refers to children who
are eligible to receive either free or reduced-price lunches at school).
Seats are then awarded based on adjusted formulas.
Plan E: 5% Economic Bonus: Same premise as Plan D, but lower bonus
award.
Plan F: 50% Allocation/5% Economic Bonus: 50% seats awarded based
on predictive formulas only.  50% allocated to the ten clusters based on
student population.  Seats are awarded within each cluster based on for-
mulas after 5% bonus is added to economically qualified students’ scores.
Plan G: 5% Public School Bonus Option: 5% bonus added to predictive
formulas of applicants attending Boston public schools. Seats are then
awarded based on the adjusted formulas.
Plan H: Public School Allocation Option: Allocate seats to Boston public
school students based on the percentage of Boston sixth-graders in public
school.
Plan I: 50% Allocation/5% BPS Bonus: 50% seats awarded based on
predictive formulas only.  50% allocated to the ten clusters based on
student population.  Seats awarded within each cluster based on formulas
after a 5% bonus is added to public school students’ scores.
Plan N: This option, selected by the School Committee and subsequently
ruled unconstitutional, is detailed in the “Background” section of this
article.
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lunches is predicted to rise dramatically to 45 percent of the student body, almost 50
percent more than the number under either the current or the unconstitutional policy.
Similarly, admission plan E gives a bonus to economically qualified students but
does not factor in neighborhood representation. Seats would be awarded to those
with the highest composite scores after a 5 percent bonus is added to the economi-
cally disadvantaged students’ composite scores. It too, much like plan F, boosts the
numbers of minority and disadvantaged students disproportionately when compared
with the fall in composite scores and creates more space for students who have at-
tended Boston public schools. Furthermore, although Bain used only qualification
for free or reduced price lunch as an economic gauge, an infusion of Kahlenberg’s
more complicated indicators into the process would do nothing to minimize minor-
ity representation. On the contrary, it would most likely bolster it, as blacks and
Hispanics in Boston suffer disproportionately in Kahlenberg’s categories.126
Why Many Criticisms of Class-Based
AffirmativeAction Would Not Apply to Boston Latin
One consistent and meritorious criticism of class-based affirmative action plans by
those who support traditional affirmative action is that it provides little aid to disad-
vantaged minorities. Although a higher percentage of blacks than whites are poor,
there are more poor whites in America than there are poor blacks.127 Thus, a ran-
domly selected black person is more likely to be poor than a randomly selected
white person.128 Twenty-one percent of black families have family incomes of less
than $10,000, compared to 6.8 percent of white families, but there are more than



















This disparity in total numbers dooms some class-based admission policies in the
eyes of affirmative action opponents as it may lead to an influx of poor and middle-
class white and Asian students, creating fewer spaces for disadvantaged blacks and
Hispanics. According to the University of Berkeley’s own 1997 report, a switch
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from race-based preferences to class-based preferences would have led to a reduction
of blacks in Berkeley’s incoming class from 6.5 percent to 3 percent.130 An unpub-
lished analysis by a Harvard economist concluded that “to replicate the current level
of nonwhite admissions, elite colleges would have to grant preferences to six times
as many low-income students,” which would “sharply lower average test scores and
displace huge numbers of high-scoring middle income whites.”131
This criticism of class-based affirmative action does not apply to Boston Latin
where, by force of numbers, minorities are not precluded from the benefits of class-
based affirmative action. Although Massachusetts is predominantly white, the city of
Boston, the area Boston Latin serves, is far more racially diverse. Over the past
decade, the student body in Boston’s public high schools has been 48 percent black,
25 percent Hispanic, 8 percent Asian, and 17 percent white.132
The most obvious analogy to possible minority admittance to Boston Latin is the
United States military. More than 5 percent of black men between the ages of 18 and
21 now apply for military service — nearly twice the rate of white applicants.133
David Armor of George Mason University has estimated that if the military admitted
all applicants on the basis of a lottery, about half the force would be black.134 Be-
cause the military has so many minority applicants from whom to choose, it can
eliminate the weakest candidates and still end up with a force that is 33 percent
black, a number roughly three times the percentage of blacks in civilian society.135
Nevertheless, critics of class-based affirmative action point out that there is an
achievement gap on standardized tests between whites and non-Asian minorities that
is not simply dependent on class.136 A recent report by the American College Board
bears out this claim.137 Blacks whose parents are upper middle class with college
degrees score much lower on standardized tests than whites from the same back-
ground.138 This pattern holds true for all economic rungs.139 As Table 3 illustrates,
the disparity between test scores is so large that, on standardized tests, affluent
blacks tend to score just below the level of some of the least-well-off whites. Test
scores by parental education and race show similar patterns of underperformance by
blacks when compared with their white counterparts.140 Table 4 illustrates this point.
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Thus, simply having a large number of lower-class blacks or blacks born to par-
ents with little education does not guarantee that these children will benefit from a
class-based scheme. Even with a boost to his composite score, a poor black child’s
standardized test score — and as a result his composite score — may still not be
high enough to gain admission to Boston Latin. The American College Board report
indicates that racism, low teacher expectations, and black and Hispanic students’
own fears of appearing “too white” are factors, distinct from class, which have ce-
mented a gap in achievement between non-Asian minorities and their white counter-
parts.141 Some critics fear that class-based affirmative action will bypass these stu-
dents. This difficult criticism strikes at the very core of class-based affirmative ac-
tion — that it targets those who are disadvantaged. Author Tung Yin has written of
the disparity in standardized test scores, “It follows that the playing field would not
be leveled unless poor blacks received the highest level of preferential treatment.”142
Despite the inability of a race-neutral, class-based affirmative action admission
policy at Boston Latin to reach some of the most underprivileged minority youths in
Boston, such a policy, regardless of its permutation, would at the very least maintain
or increase minority enrollment at Boston Latin, and increase the number of free or
reduced price lunch recipients by up to 50 percent. When analyzing class-based
affirmative action in examination-based magnet schools, one must remember that
any admission policy is not a panacea for all problems in public education. Primary
schools must work in conjunction with families to prepare each child to perform up
to his capabilities. Although aimed at combating some of the societal and educa-
tional discrimination minority children face, the policy here is also a broader mea-
sure to help any child unfortunate enough to be born into poverty, a situation over
which the child has absolutely no control. Criticism concerning class-based affirma-
tive action’s inability to reach as many minority children as may be in need is under-
standable, but it should not undermine the ultimate goal of the policy: to help disad-
vantaged children who have overcome economic obstacles and succeeded academi-
cally. On this front, the Boston public schools have yet to meet the challenge. Dur-
ing the 1998–1999 school year, 53 percent of seventh-grade invitations to Boston
Latin and almost 60 percent of ninth-grade invitations went to students of private
and parochial schools.143 In addition, certain public schools better prepared their
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students for entrance into Boston Latin. During the 1996–1997 school year, 119 of
the 513 students admitted to Boston Latin came from five public schools.144 A l five
offered advanced work.145 By contrast, 61 of the city’s other elementary schools,
which did not offer advanced work classes, had only 57 successful applicants to
Boston Latin.146 Boston Latin is only one part of a school system that must work to
provide its students with a basic education. Understandably, Boston Latin’s role in
this process is highlighted because, as an examination-based school, its emphasis
must be on admitting children who are qualified to succeed in the given curriculum.
To this end, Boston Latin cannot be held accountable for remedying the educational
deficiencies of all the underprivileged children in Boston. It can, however, offer a
real opportunity to the most talented underprivileged minority children to go to the
most prestigious public high school in Boston.
Class-Based Affirmative Action Would Not
Engender Stigmatization
Some critics of race-based affirmative action assert that a stigma attaches to the
beneficiaries of the policy, working concurrently to undermine the benefits that
accrue to the advantaged group.147 The Court in Hopwood voiced this concern:
The message from government is written very large when [affirmative action]
proliferate[s]: a double (and softer) standard for admission, a double (and softer) stan-
dard for hiring, a double (and softer) standard for promotion, a double (and softer)
standard for competitive bidding, and so on. Without question, this is a systematic racial
tagging by government, a communication to others that the race of the individual they
deal with bespeaks a race-related probability, created solely by the government itself, of
lesser qualification than others holding equivalent positions.148
One might argue that a child admitted to Boston Latin by way of a 5 percent
increase in his composite score (or any other class-based method) would know this
and, in turn, question his own abilities, much the same way a black child might
internalize negative stereotypes about his race. Furthermore, this internalization of
inferiority might be accompanied by a stigma attached to the child, his success being
attributed to the preference granted him by others.149 However, there are three fun-
damental differences between race-based and class-based affirmative action that
provide for why a stigma would not attach to the underprivileged. First, race is
easily identifiable, and socioeconomic status is much less so. Because minorities are
obviously identifiable, they are easily stigmatized as members of a group in need of
preferential treatment. There is no way to gauge whether someone was admitted
through preferential treatment based on class unless that individual makes his back-
ground known.
Second, race-based affirmative action treats an applicant as a member of a group,
not as an individual. It grants preferences on the basis of skin color without regard
to whether the individual has been confronted with the obstacles generally presented
to those of his “group.” Conversely, class-based preferences speak directly to ob-
stacles an individual has faced and what he has accomplished despite the impedi-
ments. To be accepted to Boston Latin, each underprivileged child will, at the very
least, have excelled in overcoming obstacles. Third, race, unlike class, is an immu-
table characteristic. Even if class were identifiable at first glance, Americans do not
perceive class to be static, and it is therefore less given to permanent classification.151
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Race-based affirmative action simply highlights skin color differences and con-
tinues to divide society along a racial fault line.152 Class-based preferences decrease
the public’s consciousness of race and increase its consciousness of class, a charac-
teristic that bonds many who have battled so passionately about the admissions is-
sue. Speaking on the school-busing problem in Boston in the early 1970s, Harvard
professor Robert Coles stated,
The ultimate reality is the reality of class … that’s the real struggle that’s going on. And
to talk about [busing] only in terms of racism is to miss the point. It’s working class
people who happened to be white and working class people who happened to be black
… poor people … both of whom are very hard pressed; neither of whom have got
much leverage on anything. They are both competing for a very limited piece of the pie,
the limits of which are being set by the larger limits of class which allows them damn
little, if anything.152
In moving away from race consciousness, class-based preferences may bond races
along economic lines by decreasing competitiveness between those who are, in actu-
ality, most alike.
Class-Based Affirmative Action
Would Not Subvert Meritocracy
Critics of all methods of affirmative action in education suggest that it lowers edu-
cational standards. A frequent retort to this accusation is the question By what stan-
dard does one judge?153 Over the first three hundred sixty-three years of its exist-
ence, Boston Latin did not use standardized tests for admissions.154 Instead, appli-
cants were judged by their grades and recommendations from prior schools.155 Only
in the mid-1970s did a nationally standardized independent school test begin to be
used.156 For better or worse, this is now the relevant standard to which students are
held.157 If anything, the trend toward using standardized tests in admissions is in-
creasing.158 Under the relatively simple class-based affirmative action plans put
forth by Bain (see Table 3), the percentage of seats filled by the highest-ranking
students would indeed be below both the one seen in the current policy and the
race-based policy struck down in Wessman. Under Bain proposals E and F — both
granting a 5 percent bonus to the scores of economically qualified students — 83
percent of the Boston Latin student body would be comprised of the highest-rank-
ing students as opposed to 100 percent under a strict merit selection process. Under
plan E, the other 17 percent of seats would be filled by students with scores ranging
from the 68th to 80th percentile.
 Once again, the circumstances surrounding the Boston Latin controversy under-
mine some of the hostility toward a class-based policy. Richard Kahlenberg sums up
best the principles that underlie the establishment of class-based preferences:
The system’s primary goal must be to provide genuine equality of opportunity, where
natural talents may flourish to their full potential. In order to do this, we should create
an obstacles test, which says that if a given individual did quite well, despite various
impediments, then he is very talented and/or hard working; he deserves an edge be-
cause he has great long run potential. The goal is not to absolve people from responsi-
bility for their own actions. Rather than excusing underachievement, we are saying that
if an individual has faced serious obstacles and been relatively successful anyway, he
has something special worth developing.159
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Kahlenberg’s words carry less and less weight when they are applied to circum-
stances that extend beyond the formative years. As individuals grow older, disadvan-
tage becomes increasingly enmeshed with personal life choices, and it becomes more
and more difficult to apportion blame for an individual’s lack of success. Using class
to determine who is admitted to college, who is admitted to graduate school, who is
offered a job, or who is promoted is debatable; it may be neither wise nor fair, but
Boston Latin is concerned with the test scores of children as young as eleven years
old. At such an age, it is rare that a child has yet had the opportunity to exert his will
over his situation. Thus, disadvantage rests heavily on the situation into which he
was born. Primary and secondary education is crucial to the development of social
and academic skills. If society uses class-based preferences for seventh graders, it
may more confidently use a process-oriented, formal equality approach when stu-
dents reach the age of eighteen. It is precisely when children are young that we
should attempt to determine whether they possesses what Kahlenberg terms “some-
thing special worth developing” or “great long run potential.”160 Granting an under-
privileged eleven-year-old a 5 percent increase in his composite score does little to
subvert meritocracy if he has exhibited the ability to succeed in every situation into
which the Boston public school system has placed him to date.
Class-based affirmative action offers a constitutional method of bridging the divide
between those who support race-based affirmative action and those who do not.
Given Boston’s size and diversity, class-based preferences can effectively maintain
Boston Latin’s standards while maintaining or increasing minority representation in
the student body and granting talented underprivileged children a chance at succeed-
ing on a higher level. Given our country’s constant focus on the issue of race, it is
no surprise that schemes of class-based affirmative action have met with seeming
cultural and legal hesitation. States are, however, beginning to embrace the many
advantages and legal possibilities outlined above. While still governor of Texas,
President George W. Bush oversaw a state law that guaranteed admission to a Texas
public university to every Texas student who finished in the top 10 percent of his
high school class. Thus, each student, regardless of economic class or home situa-
tion, is rewarded for succeeding in the school system into which the state of Texas
has placed him. Texas’s bold experiment is at the forefront of this new emphasis on
class disadvantage. It has already been imitated by Florida and California, and three
years into the law’s existence, the racial mix at public universities has been restored
to roughly what it was under the traditional affirmative action scheme that preceded
it.
The question now is whether the leaders of Boston are willing to put aside politi-
cal differences and follow this progressive wave. As the oldest public school in
America, and the best public school in Boston, Boston Latin stands as a natural
leader in the field of education. What better institution to start Boston down the road
to a more effective way of approaching the old problems of race and education?
Class-based affirmative action at Boston Latin offers the best opportunity for the
school and the city to unite in the common cause of educating the city’s brightest
young minds.z
*   *   *
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